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Administrative Law. In re Island Hi-Speed Ferry, LLC, 746
A.2d 1240 (R.I. 2000). The Public Utilities Commission (Commission) has the jurisdiction and power to investigate the initial rate
filing of a public utility. In order to overrule a decision made by
the Commission, the court must find that the Commission exceeded its authority or its actions were illegal, arbitrary or
unreasonable.
In In re Island Hi-Speed Ferry, LLC, 1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered whether the Public Utilities Commission
had the power to investigate the propriety of the initial rate filing
of a public utility. 2 In holding that the Commission does have that
power, the court denied the petition for certiorari. 3 In doing so, the
court noted the Commission's exclusive authority to supervise and
regulate public utilities. 4 The court also noted the limited power of
review that the court has in considering decisions made by the
Public Utilities Commission.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Petitioners sought review of a report and order made by the
Commission on March 31, 1999.6 Island Hi-Speed Ferry, LLC (HiSpeed), Interstate Navigation Company d/b/a The Block Island
Ferry (Interstate) and the Town of New Shoreham (Town) brought
separate statutory petitions pursuant to section 39-5-1 of the
Rhode Island General Laws. 7 The petitions were consolidated for
briefing and oral argument on May 27, 1999.8
The issue arose when Hi-Speed filed an application with the
Commission's Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (Division)
on February 20, 1998 to operate a passenger ferry service from
Galilee in Narragansett to New Harbor in New Shoreham, Block
Island. 9 Following that filing, Interstate and the Town both pro1. 746 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 1243-44.
3. See id. at 1247.

4. See id. at 1244.
5. See id. at 1245,

6. See id. at 1241.
7.

See id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-5-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).

8. See High Speed Ferry, 746 A.2d at 1244.
9. See id. at 1241-42.
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tested and filed motions to intervene, which were granted.' 0 After
hearings conducted concerning the proposed ferry service, the Division issued a report and order on August 25, 1998, approving HiSpeed's application." The Division also required that the proposed rates and charges of Hi-Speed's operations be filed and approved by the Commission. 12
Hi-Speed did file a proposed rate with the Commission. 13
They also filed a petition seeking a waiver of the investigation requirements of the rates, tolls and charges that were required
under section 39-3-11, pursuant to section 39-3-12.14 Hi-Speed
also filed motions seeking an exemption from the rate filing requirement and also for the rates and schedules to be approved by
the Commission, as filed, within thirty days of the filing. 15 HiSpeed wanted to speed up the process in order to begin operations
in time for the 1999 season.' 6 In an apparent attempt to frustrate
this endeavor, both the Town and Interstate were allowed to inter17
vene and contest the filing.
Hearings were conducted in which evidence and arguments
were presented to the Commission regarding the proposed rates
submitted by Hi-Speed and Interstate.' 8 In an order issued on
March 31, 1999, the Commission determined that establishing accurate rates would be difficult because of the uncertainty of ridership-related revenue for a new company in its first year using
conventionally calculated rates.' 9 Further, the Commission denied
the petition to waive the hearing and investigation requirements of
section 39-3-11.20 The Commission did, however, approve in part
the filed rates that had been amended for the 1999 season. 2 ' HiSpeed, Interstate and the Town raised several issues pertaining to
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 1242.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.; RI. Gen. Laws § 39-3-12 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
See High Speed Ferry, 746 A.2d at 1241-42.
See id. at 1242.
See id.
See id. at 1242-43.
See id. at 1243.
See id.
See id.
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the order and the propriety of the order granting the motions to
22
intervene.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The first issue the court addressed was whether the review of
the Commission's order was moot.2 3 An argument was made for
mootness because the first season rate approval was for the 1999
season, which had already passed. 2 4 The court disagreed that the
issue was moot because of the "administrative gridlock" that had
prevented Hi-Speed from operating its ferry for the prior two seasons. 25 Therefore, the court concluded that the case was one "that
[was] likely both to recur and yet to evade judicial review." 26 The
court also went on to make the determination that although the
rate setting was for the 1999 season, in actuality it was to apply to
the initial season, whenever that was to take place. 27
The second issue the court considered was the jurisdiction of
the Commission to investigate the initial rate filing of a public utility.28 This question was one of first impression for the court, which
opined that the "dearth" of new start-up utilities in Rhode Island
was the primary reason that this issue had never before been addressed. 2 9 Hi-Speed argued that the statutes in question, section
39-3-10 and section 39-3-11, allowed them merely to file the initial
rates and begin operating and that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction to investigate a public utility and its first rate. 30 It
further argued that an investigation was only appropriate when a
31
utility wanted to change its rates.
The court disagreed because it believed the Commission has a
32
"broad mandate" to make decisions involving public utilities.
33
Citing Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, the court wrote of the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 753 (R.I. 1997)).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See
See
See
See
See
See
617

id.
id. at 1243-44.
id. at 1244,
id.
id.
id.
A.2d 104, 109 (R.I. 1992).
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General Assembly's intent to vest the Commission with the exclusive authority to regulate public utilities. 3 4 That power includes
the authority to regulate and supervise companies offering energy,
transportation and communication services to the public, including
the power of investigation. 35 The court was satisfied that the Commission could act sua sponte in conducting an investigation, particularly in instances where the Commission conditioned its
36
certificate upon approval.
The third issue discussed was Hi-Speed's contention that
granting intervenor status to the Town and Interstate was both
unlawful and unreasonable.3 7 The court has the power to review
Commission orders. 38 However, findings of fact by the Commission shall be held to be prima facie true, preventing the court from
exercising independent judgment unless the Commission exceeded
its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily or unreasonably. 39 The
court found this statute to limit the court's power of review because
of the court's limited ability to review the complex technical issues
faced by the Commission. 40 Though the Commission found the intervenors' motives to be "self-serving and of questionable value,"
and the court questioned the wisdom and the appropriateness of
the Commission's decisions, the court held that those decisions
were not clearly wrong and, therefore, neither unlawful nor
41
unreasonable.
The court considered the methodology employed by the Commission in adopting Hi-Speed's initial rates. 4 2 The court again
noted the extremely deferential position that it took when reviewing the Commission's decision because of the expertise and ability
of the Commission to assimilate complex social, economical and
technical information from many sources. 43 It is also the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission to protect consumers and ensure
the economic viability of utilities. 44 The court reasoned that the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See

High Speed Ferry, 746 A.2d at 1244.
id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-1(c) (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
High Speed Ferry, 746 A.2d at 1244.
id.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-5-4 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-5-3 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
High Speed Ferry, 746 A.2d at 1245.
id. at 1246.
id.
id.

20011

SURVEY SECTION

601

Commission was faced with the difficult choice between leaving HiSpeed in a position to possibly have a revenue shortfall, and the
alternative of charging the consumer too much and creating inappropriate, excessive profits. 4 5 Though the rate determination
methodology was unusual, the factual situation presented was
unique. 4 6 Setting a revenue ceiling was a practical and prudent
course of action even if the methods utilized were somewhat divergent from the norm. 4 7 Therefore, the court concluded that it was
well within the discretion of the Commission to employ the meth48
ods that were used.
Finally, the court held that the Commission did not err in excluding expert testimony regarding unfair competition. 4 9 The
court reasoned this way because the testimony would have been
outside the scope of the investigation. 50 The investigation only
concerned the propriety of the rates and not the impact upon competitors like Interstate. 5 1 Therefore, there was no error in the ex52
clusion of that evidence.
CONCLUSION

In In re Island Hi-Speed Ferry, LLC the court reviewed decisions of the Public Utilities Commission concerning the initial rate
filing of a public utility. The court assumed a deferential posture
when reviewing decisions made by the Commission because of the
Commission's broad power and expertise in that field. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court has made it clear that decisions reached by
the Public Utilities Commission in initial rate settings and other
matters will not be overturned unless the Commission acts in an
unlawful or unreasonable manner.
Stephen P. Cooney

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 1247.
id.
id.
id.
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Administrative Law. In re Review Pursuantto 39-1-30 of Ordinance Adopted by the City of Providence, 745 A.2d 769 (R.I. 2000).
Under section 39-1-30 of the Rhode Island General Laws, the
Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC) lacks the jurisdiction to nullify or substantially amend municipal ordinances and
regulations governing the excavation and restoration of roads unless those ordinances and regulations are "unduly burdensome and
adversely affect the ability of the utility to service its customers."'
The PUC must review such municipal ordinances and regulations
under the "public interest" standard. 2 Furthermore, a challenging
utility bears the initial burden of persuasion as to whether the municipal ordinance or regulation unduly or unreasonably burdens or
restricts the operation of the utilities. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In November 1997, the petitioner, City of Providence (City) enacted an ordinance designed to balance the need for the "installation and maintenance of utility services and the maintenance of
safe and aesthetically pleasing roadways and sidewalks." 4 Specifically, the ordinance provided that every person who wished to perform excavations or lay pipe, wire, line, conduit or cable on or
under any roadway must obtain a permit by the city's director of
public works. 5 Permit applicants were required to post performance bonds and secure liability insurance. 6 Applicants were also
required to pay an administration and engineering (A & E) fee of
$40.00, with an additional A & E fee of $.25 per square foot for
excavations larger than fifty square feet. 7 Applicants were also required to pay a "pavement degradation index fee" ranging from
$.25 to $1.00 per square foot, depending on the age of the street.8
The ordinance also authorized the director of the city department of public works to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purpose of the ordinance.9 As promulgated in December
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

In re Review Pursuant to 39-1-30, 745 A.2d 769, 777 (RI. 2000).
Id. at 772.
See id.
Id. at 771 (citing Providence, RI, Ordinances ch. 23, art. 5 (1968).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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1997, these rules specified the techniques and materials to be used
in excavation and reconstruction of streets.1 0 The rules also required permit applicants to obtain a "Dig Safe" number. 1 ' Finally,
the regulations forbade street excavation from November fifteenth
to April fifteenth of every year unless the materials necessary for
"hot patch" reconstruction were available, or if there were an emer1
gency that endangered life or property. 2
A number of utilities petitioned the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission for review of the ordinance and regulations pursuant to section 39-1-30 of the Rhode Island General Laws. 13 Others
filed motions to intervene.' 4 Eventually, these petitions were consolidated.15 Providence Gas Company had previously filed a petition challenging a similar ordinance enacted by the City of
Cranston, and other utilities had intervened in this action as
well. 1 The PUC therefore held joint hearings on the ordinances of
the two cities. 17 The City of Cranston, however, entered into a settlement agreement with the utilities, which was incorporated into
the PUC decision and final order.' 8
The PUC ruled that it had jurisdiction to review the Providence ordinance and regulations under section 39-1-30 of the
Rhode Island General Laws. 19 The PUC, however, found that any
A & E fees over $40.00 and any pavement degradation fee were
20
both unreasonable and not sufficiently related to the City's costs.
Additionally, the PUC found that some aspects of the permit process and the regulations interfered with the ability of the utilities
to install and maintain their equipment. 21 Furthermore, the PUC
found that the annual moratorium interfered with the ability of
new utilities to establish and provide service. 2 2 Therefore, the
PUC nullified all of the ordinances and regulations except for the
10.
11
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-30 (1956) (Reenactment 1997).
id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-30 (1956) (Reenactment 1997).
In re Review, 745 A,2d at 771.
id.
id.
id. at 772.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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$40.00 A & E fee. 23 The City of Providence filed for review of this
24
ruling under writ of certiorari.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Granting certiorari, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed
the PUC's decision and order. 25 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
began with a de novo review of the PUC's jurisdiction under section 39-1-30 of the Rhode Island General Laws. 26 This statute
granted the PUC jurisdiction to review municipal ordinances "affecting the mode or manner of operation or the placing or maintenance of the plant and equipment of any company under the
supervision of the commission."2 7 When reviewing such ordinances, statute commanded the PUC to "determine the matter giving consideration to its effect upon the public health, safety,
28
welfare, comfort and convenience."
The PUC's argument gave great weight to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's earlier holding in Town of East Greenwich v.
O'Neil,2 9 which had invalidated a municipality's attempt to regulate the construction of high-voltage power lines.3 0 The court, however, held that O'Neil was clearly distinguishable. The PUC had
been given exclusive statutory authority over the conduct of utility
companies, and therefore had exclusive jurisdiction over the construction of high-voltage power lines. 3 1 The municipalities of
Rhode Island, however, had been given statutory authority over
the maintenance of roads since 1822.32 In 1997, the Rhode Island
General Assembly had required that any person, including utilities, who performed excavations, must restore the road to the same
or better condition.3 3 Since this statute supplied no standards for
the restoration, the court reasoned that the 1997 Rhode Island
General Assembly had intended that such work be supervised by
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 777.
See id. at 772.
Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-30 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
Id. at 773 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-30 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
617 A.2d 104 (R.I. 1992).
See O'Neil, 617 A.2d at 106.
See In re Review, 745 A.2d at 775 (citing O'Neil, 617 A.2d at 106).
See id. at 774.
See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-5-1.1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
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the municipalities ultimately responsible for the maintenance of
34
the road.
In further support of its position, the court also observed that
since 1844, the Rhode Island General Assembly had also imposed
liability on municipalities for damages caused by improper maintenance of the roads.3 5 In fact, in 1898, the court had held a municipality liable for resulting damages to a plaintiff after a utility
failed to properly repair a road. 3 6 Since the municipality could not
effectively protect itself from liability without the authority to regulate road repairs, the court reasoned the Rhode Island General
Assembly must have also intended for the municipalities to have
the authority to supervise excavation activities performed by
37
utilities.
Accordingly, the court held that PUC's jurisdictional review of
ordinances affecting utilities must be construed to accommodate
for this municipal responsibility.38 The court therefore expressly
commanded the PUC to give "due deference to the authority of the
municipality to regulate the maintenance of its highways when it
evaluates the effect of an ordinance upon a public utility."3 9 Consequently, the PUC has no jurisdiction to nullify or substantially
modify a municipal ordinance or regulation relating to road maintenance and repair unless the ordinance or regulation is "unduly
burdensome and adversely affects the ability of the utility com40
pany to service its customers."
The court then considered the standard of review used by the
PUC when reviewing the Providence ordinance. The City argued
that the PUC should have used the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 4 1 However, the court disagreed, noting that the
specific language of the statute required that the PUC "determine
the matter giving consideration to its effect upon the public health,
safety, welfare, comfort, and convenience." 42 Therefore, the PUC
had correctly enunciated the "public interest" standard when re34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.
See id. (citing Seamons v. Fitts, 40 A.3d 3, 3-4 (R.I. 1898)).
See id.
See id. at 775.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-30 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
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viewing ordinances. 4 3 However, the court clearly indicated that it
felt that the PUC had not applied that standard. The court
sharply criticized the PUC's wholesale nullification of virtually
every City attempt to regulate road repair-including the simple
permit requirement-noting that the PUC had gave virtually no effect to the municipality's authority to maintain the roads. 44 In
fact, the court observed, given that the PUC's settlement with the
City of Cranston accepted very similar regulations, the PUC had
clearly had not considered the public interest when nullifying the
45
City ordinances.
Finally, the court agreed with the City's argument that the
PUC had improperly placed the burden of persuasion on the
City.4 6 The court reiterated that under section 39-1-30, the PUC's

role was to determine whether an ordinance unreasonably affected
"the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, and convenience." 47 A
municipal ordinance is presumed to be valid. 48 Therefore, the utility bore the initial burden of proving by a fair preponderance of
evidence that the ordinance was unreasonable or an undue burden.4 9 If the utility succeeded, the burden then shifted to the City
to rebut. 50

Based on the foregoing, the Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration by PUC, encouraging the parties to attempt to settle this matter.5 1 Until then, the ordinances
52
and regulations were to remain in effect.
CONCLUSION

In re Review Pursuantto 39-1-30 held that the PUC's ability to
review and nullify municipal ordinances and regulations affecting
the operation of utilities must be construed to accommodate a municipality's clear, longstanding responsibility to maintain roads.
Unless a challenging utility succeeds in showing that a municipal
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 777.
Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-30 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ordinance or regulation regarding road excavation and repair is
unreasonable or imposes an undue burden on the utility's ability to
serve customers, the PUC may not nullify or substantially modify
those municipal ordinances and regulations. Furthermore, when
reviewing the ordinance, the PUC must employ the "public interest" standard. The court implied that a flat nullification of virtually any and all attempts at such regulations would not satisfy this
standard.
Vicki J. Bejma

